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Abstract 
(word count: 138) 
I investigate the role of education on health, using country level data and the 
production frontier framework suggested by the World Health Organization to assess 
performances of health care systems.  
I find that the role of human capital is much smaller than what appears in the WHO 
frontier model, and the relationship exhibits diminishing return in the observed range. 
Taking into account the non-linearity in this relationship generates a different ranking 
of countries according to the efficiency of their health care system.  This suggests 
that the method currently used by the WHO indeed favours health care systems 
operating in countries which underinvested in education in the past.  
The relationship between education and health changes around an average value of 
8 years of education per individual: above that level, the return of years of education 
in health is zero.  
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1. Introduction  
This study is about the role of education in the production of health; namely, are the returns 
of education on health increasing, constant or diminishing?  
This question of returns has not been investigated very often in the literature, but the 
publication by the World Health Organization in 2000 (in its World Health Report for 2000, 
WHR00 from now on) of a production frontier of health at the aggregate country level has 
opened an interesting avenue.  
The production frontier is used here as a powerful tool to investigate the shape of the 
relationship between education and health; the study was prompted by a critical appraisal 
of the surprising logical consequences of the relationship as it was estimated by the WHO, 
namely that countries would do much better, health-wise, to withdraw any Dollar away from 
their health care systems and to put the money made available in the education system. 
To overcome these weaknesses of the estimation as it was performed, I investigate the 
issue of heterogeneity: I suspect that education plays differently on health below and 
above a given threshold of education level, and I re-estimate two production frontiers, first 
among countries below the threshold, then among countries above it. 
The main aim of the present study is to build upon the production frontier analysis 
suggested in WHR00 to provide empirical insight on the effect of education on health. This 
highly debated issue in health economics has prompted empirical work aimed mainly at 
proving or disproving the causal effect of education on health, but much less on the return 
of a supplementary year of education on the health of the individual (Grossman and 
Kaestner, 1997). The present analysis of aggregated data can provide a first hint on this 
issue. I use the broad methodological frame described in WHR00, production frontier 
analysis of population health, to investigate the return of education on health at various 
levels of education.  
To do this, I have to further investigate the methodological issues involved in the estimation 
of the performance of national health care systems as carried out by WHR00. Much has   4
been done already to assess and improve the frame proposed in WHR00 (notably by 
Gravelle et al. 2002, Hollingsworth and Wildman, 2003 and Greene 2004) and the aim here 
is only to make the case for a more cautious use of the human capital variable in the 
assessment of performance of a national health care system. 
The paper is organized as follows: a second section states our knowledge on the 
relationship between education and health and the shape of the relationship (literature 
review). I then briefly describe the method used in WHR00 to assess performance of 
health care systems (section 3.1) and the specific role of human capital at the aggregated 
level: section 3.2 makes explicit why we cannot be content with the relationship between 
education and health as it is estimated in WHR00. A fourth section presents the method 
and data used to re-estimate the performance of national health care systems and the 
specific role of human capital. Results are detailed and commented in a fifth section. A last 
section briefly summarizes and concludes.  
 
2. The role of human capital in the production of health: what do we know? 
Two strands of literature investigate the relationship between education and health.  
The first one, the only one referred to in WHR00, is the so-called demographic transition 
literature, a strand of writings addressing the issue of education and population (fertility, 
and mortality) in low-income countries or in western societies of the past (Caldwell, 1993). 
According to this literature, more education means more opportunities for women, smaller 
families and more attention paid to individual achievement among children, including 
survival. In such a context, “more” education means from illiteracy to literacy, or from no 
schooling to a few years of schooling. This literature typically does not investigate the 
marginal impact of education on health at higher levels of education (say from primary to 
secondary school).   5
The strand of literature concerned with the return of education on health at high levels of 
schooling stems from Grossman’s seminal paper on health capital (Grossman, 1972)
1. 
This literature aims at assessing the true causal impact of education on health, controlling 
for a possible endogeneity effect as well as for a possible heterogeneity effect.  
Endogeneity would result from the fact that individuals with different health endowments 
might choose different education strategies; therefore, omitting to control for this bias (by 
introducing initial health in the equation for instance) would result in over-estimating the 
relationship between education and future health.  
Heterogeneity means that, if a common latent (non observable) variable such as the 
individual’s time discount rate influences both choices in health investment (smoking, 
preventative visits to physicians or nurses) and education choices, then, once again, the 
statistical relationship at the individual level would overestimate the true causal impact of 
education on health. Controlling for heterogeneity is much more complex than controlling 
for endogeneity and most of the empirical literature is about controls and their impact.  
As a result, the form of the relationship (linear, convex or concave) has not been 
extensively studied.  
In 1976, Grossman suggested that, contrary to income, education continues to influence 
health even at high level of inputs, but such a statement is absent from the most recent 
review proposed by Grossman and Kaestner (1997) or Grossman (2000).  
                                                       
1 As Pedersen (2002) has pointed out, implications of the health capital model on the production 
frontier of health differ from those of the health transition theory. According to Grossman, 
education can influence health through three different pathways: more educated individuals 
make better use of health care inputs, are more apt at choosing inputs that are good for health, 
and are more interested in being in good health than less educated ones. Among those 
pathways, only the third one would be compatible with the additive model estimated in WHR00, 
the two first ones would imply that a better educated population is more productive at using a 
given level of expenditures to reach a level of health. This would in turn entail a covariance 
approach (or multi-level estimation) where the frontier changes across countries (for an 
example of such an estimation of health care systems’ efficiency, see Or et al., 2004).   6
Grossman and Kaestner (1997) convincingly establish that, even after controlling for 
heterogeneity and endogeneity, there exists a positive and significant impact of education 
on self-assessed health on average, when comparing U.S residents, but also that it is 
much more difficult to show such an impact on mortality.  
Among the very rare studies investigating the form of the relationship at the individual 
level, it is worth mentioning that all (but, again, it is a small sample) find a non linear, rather 
concave, relationship.  
Duleep 1986, on the 1973 Exact Match Sample (matching persons in the March 1973 
American CPS with their Social Security records and tracing their mortality through 1977), 
and controlling for self assessed health and disability status prior to 1973 (to control 
endogeneity), finds a non-linear effect of schooling on  mortality: those with no or not much 
education, as well as those with some high school or 1 to 3 years of college have higher 
mortality risk than college graduates do, but high school graduates (12 years of schooling) 
have lower mortality than do those with some college.  
Similarly, Ross and Mirowsky (1999), in a study published after the Grossman and 
Kaestner review, find that the crude correlation (all other things varying) indicates a non 
linear relationship, with decreasing return of education on health. Using the simulation 
from Gilleskie and Harrison (1998), table 6, it can be shown that the gain in self assessed 
health (percentage in good or excellent health) from additional years of education 
decreases with the initial level: every additional year of schooling between 8 and 11 
increases the proportion by 2.3 percentage points for men and 3.7 for women, the 12th 
year increases it by 2.4 and 3.5, every year between 12 and 16 by 2.1 and 2.5, and 
between 16 and 18 by 1.8 and 2.1.  
Last, Curtin and Nelson (1997), in a study of the rate of return to education in developing 
countries advocating subsidies beyond the very first levels of schooling find a decline in 
the rate of return of maternal education on infants’ neonatal mortality after six years of 
schooling.  
   7
Besides measures of the effect of schooling on health, a few studies aim at explaining how 
schooling affects health. Three plausible pathways are suggested (Kaestner and 
Grossman, 1997): education enhances productivity in the use of health care to produce 
health (technical efficiency), education improves the ability to process health-related 
information (allocative efficiency, in the sense that the implicit price of inputs are changed), 
and education raises concern for health (changes in preferences). Better knowledge of 
these causal pathways could shed light on the likely profile of the relationship between 
years of schooling and health.  
Pauly (1980) shows that high school drop-outs in the U.S. in 1970 were more subject to 
supplier manipulation of their demand for health care than college graduates hence were 
less technically efficient in their production of health.  
Studies on the allocative efficiency pathway are not conclusive. 
Farrell and Fuchs (1982), testing the third pathway between education and health (more 
educated individuals value health more), focus on the impact of health on smoking when 
the decision to start smoking is usually taken, around the age of 17. They observe a 
significant negative relationship between schooling and smoking, but this difference does 
not increase between the ages of 17 and 24: future drop-outs are already more likely to 
smoke than future students, and the odd-ratio is the same. They conclude that a latent 
characteristic of individuals influence both their decision to smoke and to study and they 
suggest time discount (preference for present) could be that underlying trait. This 
prompted a controversy and studies to test whether the relationship between education 
and health was an artifact resulting from a non observable heterogeneity across 
individuals. Berger and Leigh (1989), using a two stage least squares methodology where 
the number of years of schooling is predicted by instruments (assumed to be not 
correlated with time preference), reject the hidden variable hypothesis. However, their 
choice of instruments can be criticized: they use parents’ schooling and ancestry to identify 
schooling, while Becker and Mulligan (1997) offer evidence that time preference is   8
culturally transmitted from parents to children
2. More important for our purpose, they 
estimate a purely linear relationship between (instrumented) schooling and health, 
therefore failing to address directly the observation in Farrell and Fuchs that differences in 
preferences for health are already determined at age 17. Last, Hunt-McCool and Bishop 
(1998) present evidence that individual heterogeneity (not linked to time preference) 
explain the relationship between schooling and mental health. 
 
Hence, not only is the quasi-constant rate of return of education on health questionable in 
its consequences, it is not confirmed in the empirical literature based on individual data. 
This finding is also contingent to choices in the specification of the production frontier.  
 
3. The production frontier of health and the role of education according to the WHO: 
3.1 The production frontier of health in WHR00: 
The last chapter of WHR00 attempts at measuring the performance of health care systems 
in all 191 member states in a way that is comparable across countries, therefore allowing 
to rank national systems in a league table (a summarized account of the health system 
performance assessment frame is provided in the appendix 1 below).  
The concept of performance is what economists usually call technical efficiency 
(Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000): how much is produced relative to what could be achieved 
given the amount of resources used.  






. In WHR00 the output Y can be 
comprised of two different things: a health outcome, disability adjusted life expectancy 
(DALE, the life expectancy at birth, minus the portions of years of life “lost” due to 
                                                       
2 They suggest that education can increase the ability to take future benefits and harms into 
account when making current decision, but also provide evidence that parental wealth is the   9
impairment or disability when lived in a less than perfect health state), or a composite 
outcome of DALE, inequality in health, responsiveness and inequality in responsiveness, 
and equity in financing.  
The composite outcome as it was in WHR00 has been heavily criticized on two justified 
grounds: most of the 191 countries couldn’t provide data on inequality of health, 
responsiveness or financing and the composite index was therefore imputed rather than 
measured, casting doubt on the significance of the efficiency scores of the majority of the 
health care systems; second, the same weights were used for all 191 countries, implying 
that all countries would make the same trade-offs between life expectancy and 
responsiveness or equity, independent of their current level of life expectancy (or equity). 
Since the present analysis focuses on the link between education and health, rather than 
education and the health care system, I will be content to use DALE, the first and simpler 
outcome
3.  






; the WHO further 
refines the definition to acknowledge the fact that, even in the absence of any health care 
system, something is produced in terms of DALE (a proportion of individuals survive their 










. This latter refinement is 
only a matter of scale and should not alter the relative performance of health care systems.  
 
What really determines the way efficiency is estimated is the way the maximum feasible 
output is calculated (the well known concept of the production frontier) or what is 
                                                                                                                                                             
main determinant of patience. 
3 DALE itself is not exempt from criticism: as it was measured in 2000 it was a mix of 
epidemiological knowledge (on the prevalence of diseases) and expert guesstimates (of the 
relative values of years of life lived with different conditions), relying on implicit assumptions on 
the link between disease and the prevalence of disability (Williams, 1999, Nord, 2002).    10
achievable given a level of inputs when there is no waste. There are many admissible 
ways of determining a production frontier for a given output hence the set of national 
efficiencies is conditional on the method. Even among the family of stochastic frontiers 
where the frontier is derived from the actual scatter-plot of inputs and output level of 
observed national health care systems several different methods and specifications can be 
found.  
WHR00 made use of repeated observations (the same variables were observed every 
year from 1993 to 1997 on the same set of countries) to estimate a fixed effect production 
frontier (or within estimator). On the set of inputs X and output DALE of 191 countries 
observed at five different points in time, the following equation is estimated: 
t i i t i t i v u X B A DALE , , , . + + + = ,  
The frontier is given in WHR00 by )) ( max ( . ,
max
i i t i i u A X B DALE + + =  
Besides choosing an estimation method, the other main issue is the set of variables(X) to 
be included in the equation, or the factors of production of aggregate health. In WHR00 
and HSPA03, the WHO argues for a very limited set of variables, namely expenditures on 
health care at the country level, number of years of education (as a proxy for human 
capital) and its squared value. A detailed account of the reasons for such a choice and the 
criticisms it has prompted is given in appendix 2. 
 
3.1 The role of human capital on health in WHR00 and its unexpected consequences 
on public policy 
The main focus of this paper is on the relationship between health and the only factor 
controlled for in the WHO study, namely the average number of years of education of the 
adult population. In particular, I aim to improve the production frontier estimations 
produced by the WHR00.   11
WHR00 estimates the following production frontier using a within (fixed-effect) estimator, 
and a translog functional specification:  
Log(DALEmax,i) =  
0.00885×Log(EXPi) + 0.06301×Log(EDUi) + 0.0217×[Log(EDUi)]² +  
(3.81252 +0.21441) 
In the panel of 191 countries examined by WHR00, EXP ranges from $20 (in the poorest 
African countries) to $3,724 in the USA, and EDU from 0 to 12 years. 
The following graph illustrates the role of human capital in such a production frontier:  
Figure 1 
 
Figure 1 shows that, even at levels too high to be actually observed, human capital is 
described as having a highly positive rate of return on health. For example, raising the 
average number of years of education by 0.5 years from an initial of 8.5 allows a country 
which spends $1,500 per capita for medical care to increase its disability adjusted life 
expectancy by 0.7 year (from 75.6 to 76.3). On the other hand, increasing the medical 
expenditure by 33% from 1,500 to 2,000 per capita and per year in a country with an 
average number of years of education of 8 years would allow that fictional country to 
increase its maximum feasible DALE by 0.2 year only. 
Such a production frontier entails two consequences: first, as pointed out by Hill (2001) “a 
country [rather its health care system] that has invested heavily in education in the past will 
be penalized relative to one that has not”. More accurately, the health care system of such 
a country will be penalized (deemed inefficient) if, and only if, the estimated production 
frontier is not the true one; if the true rate of return of education on health is indeed smaller 
than what is estimated in WHR00, for instance at higher levels of education, then countries 
such as Canada, Sweden, or the U.K. that have invested heavily in education in the past 
(OECD, 2000, Barro and Lee, 2000) will, as a result, see their health care system’s 
efficiency underestimated whereas countries such as France, Italy or Spain, that have   12
invested less heavily in education in the past (OECD, 2000, Barro and Lee, 2000) will, as a 
result, see their health care system’s efficiency overestimated in WHR00. The present 
analysis was partially prompted by the fact that these (relatively) low educated countries 
were doing very well in WHR00 (respectively ranked 4
th, 3
rd and 6
th), when Canada ranked 
35
th, Sweden 21
st and the U.K. 24
th.  
Some very simple use of the production frontier, as estimated by WHR00, show that much 
of the differences in efficiency among rich countries stem in fact from differences in 
education levels. For instance, neutralizing differences in that variable, Japan becomes 
more efficient than France, and Australia and Sweden reach the same level. Canada, the 
Netherlands, and Switzerland fall behind by 2 percentage points only and for the other 
countries, it reduces the difference with France by between half and two thirds (for details 
on these results and the method used, see appendix 2). 
Second, if that production frontier is the true one, one might wonder why Governments 
continue to pour money into their health care system. Auster et al. (1969) reached such a 
conclusion based on their findings that the respective elasticities of mortality across states 
in the U.S. to medical expenditures and years of education were -0.1 and -0.2 and an 
estimation that, in 1960, raising education (number of years of schooling) by 1% cost 1.5 of 
what was needed to raise medical expenditure by 1%. Today, investing in education 
should be even more efficient, at least in rich countries, where spending in medical care 
has increased much more than spending in education (or even than education).  
I use back of the envelope calculations to estimate the impact on health of switching funds 
from health care to education, assuming the WHR00’s frontier is the true one. In France, 
public spending on education is 6.1% of GDP, and 15 cohorts are educated. Therefore, 
increasing the average number of years of education by 1 year on the whole population 
would cost 6.1*(80/15), assuming 80 living cohorts of the same size (this is conservative 
since it overestimates the spending necessary to increase human capital). We can then 
calculate how much years of education on average a Government would buy by switching 
1% of what it spends on medical care, assuming WHR00 has correctly estimated the   13
return of education on health; moreover, since education is a capital, switching funds 
toward education has an accruing effect on health. Such simple calculations show that 
switching 1% of medical expenditures toward education in France would first decrease 
DALE by 0.003 year, but DALE would be greater than the initial value by 0.002 in year 2, 
and the gain after 10 years would be 0.035 years. Switching 10% would entail a loss of 
0.028 years of DALE in first year, but a gain in the second year (+0.013) and an overall 
gain after 10 years of 0.34 years of DALE. To gain 1 year of DALE after 10 years, the 
French Government should cut 33% of the budget on health care and switch it to 
education. Of more concern, a cut of 67% would still yield benefit (if switched to 
education): the first year with only one third of expenditures on medical care would 
decrease DALE by almost half a year, but the accrual in human capital would cancel it out 
after three years and there would still be a gain (of 1.86 years) after 10 years.  
Judged by its consequences, the production frontier of health using health care and 
human capital as it is estimated by WHR00 doesn’t seem credible. The remaining of the 
paper builds upon the broad methodological frame and tries to improve the estimation of 
the relationship between education and health, investigating heterogeneity and the 
potential for diminishing returns.  
 
4. Re-specifying the production frontier – data an methods 
4.1 Previous literature: 
Kathuria and Sankhar  (2005) apply the WHR00 method to measure the efficiency of 
health care systems of the States of India. In their first step only public health inputs are 
used to determine the frontier, the output being infant mortality rate; other determinants are 
introduced in a second step, to explain efficiency (once again, assumed constant for each 
state over the period of panel observation, namely 1986-1997). Surprisingly, literacy rate is 
never significant in this second step; the only significant factor of efficiency is whether 
families have access to a lavatory or not.   14
As developed below, Gravelle et al (2002) recommend a between rather than a within 
estimator, due mainly to a lack of variance over repeated observations for a same country. 
Interestingly, their between estimator (using the same data as WHR00, but pooling data for 
all years on a same country) shows a strongly declining return of education on health (due 
to a significant negative coefficient on the squared value of years of education): increasing 
education from 4 to 5 years increases DALE by 4.7%, but one more year of education from 
8 to 9 increases DALE by 2.2% only. As a result, switching budget from health care to 
education now indicates (with this new production frontier) that switching 1% of the health 
care budget to education would yield a decrease of 0.054 years of DALE in first year and a 
decline of 0.008 after 10 years. Switching 10% would entail a loss by more than half a year 
in first year, and still a loss 0.12 years of DALE in the 10
th year. If the between estimator is 
correct, one can understand why Governments keep on spending in medical care in order 
to produce health.  
Hollingsworth and Wildman (2003) raise the heterogeneity issue: even using a within 
estimator, the production frontier among OECD countries exhibits diminishing returns of 
education on health in the range of observed values. Increasing education from 4 to 5 
years raises DALE by 5.9% but one more year of education from 8 to 9 increases DALE by 
2.7% only among this reduced set of 30 rich countries. Interestingly, the coefficient for 
squared number of years of education is negative among OECD countries and positive 
among non OECD countries. Since OECD countries also are characterized by a much 
higher level of education (8.93 years on average versus 5.30) there are good reasons to 
suspect this heterogeneity simply reflects a decreasing return of education on health 
beyond a threshold.  
Hollingsworth and Wildman produce different production frontiers for the sets of OECD 
and non OECD countries, and Greene (2004) confirms that income per capita is a strong 
factor of heterogeneity in the way health is produced. However, as shown in Hollingsworth 
and Wildman, since there are only 30 OECD countries, production frontiers estimated on a 
set restricted to these countries only are not robust. They even conclude that, among   15
OECD countries, expenditure and education don’t explain much of health, but this could be 
due to lack of power.  
Contrary to Hollingsworth and Wildman, Or (2000) finds a highly statistically significant 
constant return of human capital on health (she uses potential years of life lost as the 
outcome measure rather than DALE) among OECD countries. However, as she points out, 
her measure of human capital (the share of white collars in the workforce) is rather a proxy 
for both education and working conditions than for education only. Moreover, she doesn’t 
allow any quadratic form for the effect of the proxy on health. 
 
4.2 Present study: 
Following Hollingsworth and Wildman (2004), I try to re-estimate two sets of production 
frontiers; however, instead of separating two sets of countries using an external threshold 
(being an OECD member) I use education as a way of increasing homogeneity: I suspect 
that education plays differently on health below and above a given threshold, and I re-
estimate the production frontiers first among countries below the threshold, then among 
countries above it. 
The data used in WHR00 have not been made available to the public; Pedersen (2001) 
pointed out that the discussion paper #7, supposed to provide and detail these data has 
never been posted on the WHO site, and it has not been either since. I tried in 2001-02 to 
obtain the data directly from the WHO but was not successful. Hence, I was not able to 
replicate, as in Gravelle et al. (2002), or Hollingsworth and Wildman (2003), the estimation 
of the production frontier using exactly the same data as WHR00.  
I use instead the data published in WHR00, namely DALE for each country in 1997, and 
health care expenditures in international (PPP) dollars, in 1997 as well. I add the average 
number of years of education in the population aged 15 and over in 1995 as published by   16
Barro and Lee (2000, table #3)
4. In choosing the population age 15 and over as the 
reference population (rather than the population age 25 and over, also available in Barro 
and Lee’s data sets), I use the same indicator as WHR00 (see HSPA, page 687). Note 
that this indicator is better suited to developing countries than to developed countries 
where a large fraction of individuals age 15 to 25 are still out of the labour force.  
Barro and Lee provide data for 112 countries only in 1995 (they gathered data on 142 
countries for at least one year between 1960 and 2000), 111 of which are in the WHR00 
panel (Taiwan is not a member state of the WHO). They use censuses and UNESCO data 
to estimate the average number of years of schooling in the population. As they point out, 
this captures quantity of education rather than quality, and, on the subset of countries for 
which the average number of years of education and students’ scores are known, 
correlation between these two measures is weak (at 0.38); I use this indicator of human 
capital, although it is far from perfect, to preserve comparability with WHR00 and because 
it is known on many more countries than all other indicators (students scores are known 
for a smaller subset of 39 countries).  
Descriptive statistics are provided in table 1 below (and detailed data are in table 5). 
Table 1 here 
 
I estimate the production frontier and test for heterogeneity on these 111 countries for 
which I have data on disability adjusted life expectancy, health care expenditures in $PPP, 
and average years of education in the population age 15 and over; the two first measures 
are for 1997, the third one for 1995. 
                                                       
4 Here is another puzzle about the data used in WHR00: Barro and Lee (2000) have produced 
the most complete set of data on the stock of education in populations of the world, but they 
have limited themselves to quinquennial measurements, whereas WHR00 uses yearly 
measurements (from 1993 to 1997).   17
Since I couldn’t use repeated observations, but had only one observation per country, fixed 
or random effects estimations were not an alternative. Among stochastic frontier estimates, 
the composed error model is the natural choice with such data. In order to decompose the 
error term, I use a “normal half-normal” hypothesis (the purely random term is normal, and 
the efficiency term follows a half-normal non positive distribution) following Kumbhakar and 
Lovell, (2000). They show that in most of cases imposing a more flexible constraint on the 
distribution of the error term (such as truncated distributions) add computation difficulties 
but does not yield substantially different estimates. 
The present choice of method is certainly constrained by the data at hand, and good panel 
data would be better than a cross-section. However, as Gravelle et al. (2002) showed the 
data used in WHR00 are not really panel data (almost all the variation in the data is 
between rather than within countries), and therefore recommend using composed error 
model (at least in the family of stochastic frontier estimates).  
In the composed error model, the following equation is estimated: 
i i i i v u X B A DALE + + + = .  where u is the efficiency component in the error term of the 
regression, constrained to be nonnegative, and v is the random component in the error 
term. The sum (u+v) is skewed, indicating potential inefficiency.  For each unit, technical 
inefficiency is given by  ) ) (exp( i i i u E TE ε − =  (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). 
 
Since I suspect the impact of education on health to be different at different levels of the 
input, I test for a standard mis-specification known as parameter inconstancy (Kennedy, 
2003). I use a straightforward procedure, suggested in Kennedy (2003), to determine two 
“regimes” in the quadratic relationship between education and health: in the first regime, 
observed on lower values of years of education, the coefficients for education and its 
squared value are expected to be both positive or to yield strongly positive returns in its 
range of values for education. In the second regime, observed above the cut-off point for 
the number of years of education, the coefficient for the squared value is expected to be   18
negative and return of education on health declines rapidly. The procedure is as follows: 
first, I split the population of 111 countries into two subsets, one comprised of countries 
with values for EDU (the average number of years of education in the population age 15 
and over) below a threshold and one comprised of countries with values of the same 
variable above the threshold. I then vary the threshold and pick the cut-off point as the 
value for the threshold that minimizes the sum of SSR (sum of squared residuals) in both 
equations. The cut-off value is therefore the value that separates the data into two regimes 
in order to better fit a piece-wise linear relationship between the output on one hand 
(disability adjusted life expectancy) and the inputs on the other hand (health care 
expenditures, education and its squared value).  
I then use a Chow test to control that the two regimes thus identified are significantly 
different, in other words, that the coefficients estimated below and above the cut-off points 
really are different.  
There exist more sophisticated procedures to find such non linearities or changes in the 
value of a parameter in a linear relationship, e.g. non-parametric estimates. I chose to rely 
on simpler approaches for two reasons though: first, with only 111 observations in the 
sample, non parametric approaches wouldn’t work; second, I use the specified relationship 
to estimate a production frontier and must therefore keep it reasonably simple. 
Once the cut-off point is known two production frontiers are estimated following both a 
composed error model (normal, half-normal hypothesis, using STATA 8.0). The result is 
two league tables of countries according to efficiency: one table for countries with high 
level of education and one table for countries with low level of education.  
 
5 Results 
Since I use a slightly different data set, I start by comparing my estimates with those of 
previous studies. Gravelle et al (2002) provide a stochastic production frontier, estimated 
on all 191 countries, using a between (rather than fixed effect) model. I use a between 
model, on 111 countries only and using different data for education.    19
Table 2 here 
 
Table 2 confirms that my estimates are in the range of those based on the same 
assumptions (between model) but on a slightly different data set found in prior studies. 
I start with identifying the cut-off point. I searched for such a cut-off point in a range that 
would split the data set into two subsets of reasonable size (not below 30), hence between 
4.09 and 7.25. Table 3 provides the SSRs obtained for various thresholds used to split to 
population of 111 countries into two subsets, one with values for education below the 
threshold, and the other subset above the threshold. Table 3 provides SSRs for threshold 
values between 5.0 and 6.8 only, other values being much higher. 
Table 3 here 
 
According to table 3, 5.8 years of education seems to be a reasonable cut-off point 
between two regimes of relationship between education and health: below 5.8, we expect 
stronger return of education on health; above 5.8 the coefficients of the quadratic 
relationship are different from those estimated in the low education regime and yield a 
more rapidly decreasing rate of return of education on health.  
The Chow test confirms that coefficients differ below and above the threshold of 5.8, with a 
Fisher (4,103) equal to 6.45 and a significance level smaller than 0.1%. 
Contrary to the measure of heterogeneity as performed in Hollingsworth and Wildman 
(2003) (OECD versus non OECD), the relationship between health and its determinants is 
not too badly fitted in the present study even among the subset of high education countries 
(R2 = 38%), whereas expenditures and education didn’t explain much among OECD 
countries. As detailed below (table 4), the set of high education countries include most of 
OECD countries, but also non OECD countries, indicating that heterogeneity and   20
inconstancy in parameters might prompt from the level of education input rather than from 
differences in income per capita
5. 
Clearly, 5.8 is the best cut-off from a linear model fitting perspective but any value between 
5.5 and 6.0 could have been picked as the cut-off. In other words, the results suggest that 
after six years of education (the beginning of a secondary level in many countries, around 
the age of 12), there is a discontinuous change in the relationship between education and 
health.  
The results of the test provide evidence on heterogeneity in terms of education levels in 
the WHR00 model and fix that potential heterogeneity by identifying a cut-off point and two 
regimes in the relationship between education, expenditure and health. So, the first result 
of that study is the information on the value of a cut-off point and the two regimes in 
explaining the return of education on health at various levels.  
 
Using this cut-off point, I then estimate the stochastic production frontiers for the two 
groups (high and low education countries), as well as the technical efficiency indices 
associated to it. 
Table 4 here 
 
Table 4 indicates that, in both subsets, the coefficient for the squared value of education is 
negative
6.   
                                                       
5  Almost all OECD are in the high education regime, except for Turkey, Portugal and 
Luxembourg, the latter having no information available for 1995. 32 non OECD countries 
also are in this high education regime. 
 
6   Whereas it was positive among non OECD countries according to Hollingsworth and 
Wildman (2003)   21
It can be seen also from table 4 that the impact of education on the maximum attainable 
level of health differs in both subsets. In low education countries, adding one year of 
education at the 5.8 level adds 1.02 years of disability adjusted life expectancy and the 
marginal impact of education on health becomes negative above approximately 20 years 
of education, well above the observed range. In high education countries, increasing the 
education level one year from 5.8 to 6.8, adds 1.06 years to DALE, (instead of 1.02), but 
the rate of returns decreases steadily toward 0 and is 0 for 8.48 years or Ln(education) = 
2.78/1.30. If this production frontier is correct, there is no gain in population health in 
investing in education above 9 years.  
These results based on aggregated data are consistent with the rare individual level 
studies showing stabilization or even a decrease in health between those having 
completed high school and those with superior education.  
Following Gravelle et al. (2002) estimation: switching 1% of the health care budget to 
education would yield a decrease of 0.029 years of DALE in first year and a decline of 
0.006 after 10 years. Switching 10% would entail a loss by 0.30 year in first year, and still a 
loss 0.14 years of DALE in the 10
th year.  
 
Table 4 also indicates that, among high education countries, the frontier is almost 
deterministic, with a very small variance for the pure random part of the error term (and 
consequently, a very high value for the ratio of the inefficiency variance to the random 
variance).  
 
As shown in table 5, technical efficiencies calculated using this new production frontier 
yield a different league (or rather two different league tables) of health care systems 
according to efficiency. Countries with “rational” systems (where explicit schemes are 
aimed at rendering the whole system more efficient in the very meaning of the WHO) such 
as New Zealand, Australia, and Canada tend to do much better in that new league, where 
human capital plays a smaller role at high levels. The U.S. is also better treated under this   22





th, respectively). Other countries with a much better ranking according to this 
production frontier are Croatia, Guyana, China, Sri Lanka, and Cuba. 
Austria, the Netherlands, Ireland, France, and Denmark are among the countries doing 
less well under the new production frontier, together with Uruguay and Argentina.  
This alternative league table, where human capital plays a much smaller role among high-
education countries, seems therefore more realistic (it gives a fairer account of the true 
endeavour of health care systems) than the one found in WHR00. However, it is not 
exempt from the criticisms addressed to the production frontier in WHR00, namely 
specification choices of the set of X variables (health care expenditures, education and its 
squared values). Therefore, it is only a marginal improvement, and further evidence of 
diminishing returns of education on health, but certainly not the optimal production frontier 
of health at the aggregate level.  
Even if this study is not aimed at fixing other specification issues raised in the literature on 
the WHO 2000 report, most importantly the absence of income per capita or of the 
inequality in the distribution of income (Greene, 2004), I ran a linear regression (ordinary 
least squares) of DALE with income per capita (in international $, value for 1997, source: 
World Bank – www.devdata.worldbank.org/query/default.htm) as an additional 
independent variable (besides expenditures par capita on health care, years of education 
and its squared value). This can be seen as a robustness check.  
There are 106 countries with non missing values. The coefficient on expenditure turns out 
to be non significant anymore and the coefficient on the log of income is strongly positive 
(+0.204); coefficients on education are not much affected by the introduction of income per 
capita: the coefficient on log of years of education diminishes slightly (from 0.245 to 0.172) 
and the coefficient on the squared value remains constant. Performing the Chow test on 
the coefficients for income (GDP per capita), education and its squared value yields the 
same conclusion that there are two regimes in the relationship between education and 
health at the aggregate level: the Fisher statistic for the test of any difference in the value   23
of the coefficients for education and its squared value between the two groups of countries 
(those with less than 5.8 years of education and those with more) is 7.89 (probability 
smaller than 0.1%) and for any difference in the value of the coefficients for income, 
education, and its squared value the Fisher statistic is 6.03 (probability smaller than 0.1%). 
Moreover, qualitative effects are the same when income is substituted for health care 
expenditure in the equation. Therefore, this study confirms previous conclusions by 
Hollingsworth and Wildman (2003), and Greene (2004) regarding the respective roles of 
income and health care expenditure in the production frontier of health, but also points that 
the relationship between education and health is not affected by the choice of the variable 
for the ‘wealth’ (income or expenditure) of countries’ health care systems.  
 
6 Conclusions 
Using data at the country level and a production frontier framework built upon that 
suggested by the WHO in WHR00, I show that the impact of education on health (disability 
adjusted life expectancy) follows two different regimes; among countries with a low level of 
education (below 5.8 years on average) the elasticity of health to education declines from 
0.15 in a country with 4 years of education on average (if that country has a DALE of 60, 
increasing education by one year on average in the whole population would increase 
DALE by 2.3 years) to 0.11 in a country with 6 years of education on average (starting 
from a DALE of 60, the impact of increasing education by one year would only 1.1 years of 
DALE). Among countries with a high level of education, it doesn’t pay (in health) to 
increase education above 8 years per individual on average in the population. This finding 
is certainly to be discussed and re-estimated with other data, among which individual level 
data focusing on the functional relationship between schooling and health rather than on 
the mere significance of the effect, but it suggests that the impact of schooling on health is 
smaller when the individual has received 8 years of schooling.  
The second indication from this study is that the evaluation of efficiency of health care at 
the national level using country level data and modeling health care systems as producers   24
of population health requires thorough investigation of the specification of the production 
frontier, and of the role of human capital on health. Every economist will agree that 
education is a determinant of health that is not controlled by the health care system and 
must be, for these reasons, included in the production frontier. However, the functional 
form used to include it in the estimation seems to influence the estimated values and 
countries ranking. If any policy recommendation must be drawn from such a league table, 
it is important that the rankings actually reflect differences in efficiency rather than 
specification errors.  
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Appendix 1:  a brief account of the health system performance assessment by the WHO: 
In its world health report for the year 2000, the World Health Organization (WHO) launched 
an estimation of the efficiency (called performance in the initial report) of national health 
care systems among its 191 member countries (WHO, 2000). Efficiency is measured as 
the ratio of what is achieved to what should have been achieved given the amount of 
resources available, or the production frontier of health.  
This endeavor has been criticized on many grounds and from various perspectives. Some 
objected the very idea of ranking all systems on a single scale, irrespective of the local 
objectives and preferences of societies (Navarro, 2001) or the constraints they face (Coyne 
and Hilsenrath, 2002). Williams (2001) stressed the lack of policy relevance of the whole 
exercise, arguing that policy makers are not faced with absolute objectives (producing the 
health of the population) but rather incremental choices (choosing one treatment over 
another, given the current level of achievement).  
Even when the general aim was agreed upon, choices of methods were seen as arbitrary 
and even based on an implicit normative conception of health and health care. Some 
criticized the preeminence given to medical services over other (deemed more important) 
determinants of health such as prevention, income, inequalities, or social capital in the 
measurement of performance by the WHO (Navarro, 2002, Robbins, 2001, Almeida et al. 
2001). Others made more specific objections on the way some dimensions of what is 
produced by a health care system is measured (Braveman et al., 2001 on equity or 
Williams 2001 on health status and the composite index of achievement).  Almost all 
reviewers of the WHR00 pointed out the paucity and unreliability of data on which each 
country achievement and efficiency was assessed. Last, a few articles criticized the 
econometric approach of the WHR00, focusing mainly on specification issues (Pedersen, 
2002, Gravelle et al. 2002, Hollingsworth and Wildman, 2003, Greene, 2004). All 
evidenced the lack of robustness of results (efficiency levels and rankings) to choices of 
econometric tools.   26
To address these criticisms the WHO has set up a scientific peer review group in 2001 
(SPRG), and edited in 2003 a book, called Health System Performance Assessment (from 
now on, HSPA03) comprised of the SPRG’s answers and complementary analyses in 
response to these criticisms (WHO, 2003). To summarize this large and rich volume in a 
few words, the WHO has acknowledged most of the criticisms targeted toward data quality 
but has remained adamant on methodological issues. As a result, should the health system 
performance assessment league table be reiterated (it was supposed to be in 2002 and 
every other year from then on), it would rely on much better quality data, but would still use 
the same methods and specifications.    27
Appendix 2: choice of X variables in the production frontier in WHR00: 
WHR00 opted for the following rationale: include all resources directly attributed to the 
health care system as well as factors contributing to health and beyond the reach of the 
health care system (from now on the latter will be referred to as “controlling factors”).  
Ideally, the set of resources directly attributed to the health care system would include the 
density of physicians, the average cost of a physician’s visit, the density of hospital beds, 
and expenditures on drugs but, for reason of data availability, WHR00 was content with 
total health care expenditure in each country. Hence, efficiency is the ratio of actual 
outcome (DALE) to the amount of outcome that could be expected with the same level of 
expenditure on health care
7. As a result, no insight can be provided on allocative efficiency 
of a country’s health care system (choosing the wrong mix of inputs given their relative 
prices). 
Among the set of controlling factors, one would expect to find income per capita, the 
average human capital available in the population, climatic environment, epidemiologic 
environment of the country etc. However, the only other explanatory variable X in WHR00 
estimations is education, more precisely, the number of years of education on average in 
the population aged 25 and over of each country.  
Much has been written about the limited number of explanatory variables controlled for in 
WHR00 estimations, a list that boils down to the average number of years of education 
(and its squared value).  
The WHO team argue that climatic and epidemiologic environments are not beyond reach 
of the public health care system: they state, convincingly, that the health care system can 
be held responsible for (not) preventing smoking, drinking or violence in the population, 
and, less convincingly (see Jamison and Sandbu, 2001), that the prevalence of tropical 
conditions or the spread of epidemics such as AIDS should be taken into account by the 
health care system when it allocates resources. Therefore, these variables are not   28
included in the estimations of performance of the health care system in WHR00, but are 
used, in HSPA03, in a second step to explain countries’ inefficiencies
8. 
The exclusion of income per capita as a relevant controlling factor pointed as a major 
problem for WHO estimations (e.g. Pedersen, 2002). While WHR00 accepted the role of 
income per capita as a potential determinant of health it was argued that the inclusion of 
income (measured as GDP per capita) would produce problems of multicollinearity in the 
estimations. In HSPA03, it is suggested that part of the correlation between income and 
health stems from increased access to medical care due to higher income. The residuals 
of the regression of income per capita on health care expenditures and education were 
entered in the equation explaining DALE, rather than income per capita itself, and were 
found to be non significant. Gravelle et al. (2002) show however that the pure effect of 
health care expenditure (entering the residual of a regression of health care expenditure 
on income in the equation explaining health, controlling for income and education) is not 
significant either. They conclude that WHR00 has made an arbitrary choice in choosing 
expenditure rather than income per capita
9. 
The exclusion of income inequality (briefly mentioned in HSPA03) as a potential 
determinant of health did not get much attention in the literature even though it can be 
considered as an important factor determining health status beyond the reach of the health 
                                                                                                                                                             
7 Expenditures are measured in international dollars (using the Purchasing Power Parity index) 
8 Pedersen (2002) points out that such a two step procedure is inconsistent since it assumes 
that residuals are identically distributed in the first step then vary systematically with explanatory 
variables in the second step. The standard procedure would be to include all factors in the 
same step.  
9 Singling out health care expenditures as the sole input raises other issues, among which the 
fact that using current health expenditure as a factor of current life expectancy the chosen 
model does not recognize the important time lags that exist in producing health outcomes 
(SRPG, 2002, Grignon, 2001). The WHO team addresses this issue in the HSPA volume 
(WHO, 2003, page 701) in that they suggest using incidence DALE (or HALE, Health Adjusted 
Life Expectancy as the terminology has evolved in 2003) instead of prevalence DALE as their 
measure of output.   29
care sector. WHR00 and HSPA03 do not provide any argument (theoretical or 
econometric) for this choice. Using the same data as WHR00, and adding the GINI index 
of income distributions, Greene (2004) shows that inequality of income is a strong and 
significant determinant of average health in a country.   30
 
Appendix 3: simulations of the impact of education on performance (comparative static).  
Using the estimated parameters of the production frontier, we can calculate the 
performance of fictitious countries. Creating countries with values for DALE and EXP 
similar to the French ones and attributing to these fictitious countries values for EDU 
chosen among those of other rich countries (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Japan, New 
Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the United-Kingdom, the USA, as well as some Southern 
European countries) allows one to assess the impact of human capital on the 
performance of the health care system assuming the WHR00’s production frontier is the 
true one. Such an exercise can be called simulation in that it creates virtual realities, even 
though it has nothing to do with what statisticians called simulations, or the use of Monte 
Carlo replications of a random phenomenon (I thank an anonymous referee for having 
pointed this ambiguity out in a previous version of the text). 
How does it work? If one knows all the values used by WHR00 (including DALEmin), 
the logic is straightforward and goes without saying. However, as mentioned by Petersen 
(2001), the key Discussion Paper #7 in the HSPA series, which is supposed to provide all 
the data used by WHR00 has never been posted on the WHO website (I made a request 
to get the data, but was not able to get it). Hence, I had to deduce DALEmin from the 
other published data. For a given country, DALEmin is given by:  
DALEmin i = (DALEi - PERFi×E(DALEmax | EXPi, EDUi))/(1-PERFi). 
EDU has not been published either, therefore I used the data provided by Barro andLee 
(2000) and was able to infer values for DALEmin in an reasonable range (between 28 
and 47, life expectancy was around 50 in 1913 in France, according to Bideau et al. 
1988) for 30 countries, but not for Norway (1.5), Portugal (51.1), and Spain (65.7). 
Leaving these countries aside, and based on such calculated DALEmin, it appears that a 
country similar to France but with the human capital of Australia would have an efficiency 
smaller by 13.6 percentage points than that of France, if the WHR00 frontier were true.   31
Among countries penalized by their human capital level are found the U.S. (12.6 
percentage points), New Zealand (12.4) and South Korea (10.1). Scandinavian countries 
are found just behind, in a category where human capital decreases performance by 10.3 
to 8.4 percentage points.  
Another way to describe the impact of human capital on performance, such as it is 
estimated in WHR00 is to measure the difference between the fictitious country (local 
EDU but French EXP and DALE) and the actual local country. It shows that human 
capital explains all the difference between France and Japan, Australia and Sweden, 
almost all the difference between Canada, the Netherlands and Switzerland. Neutralizing 
EDU reduces the difference between France and the U.K, Austria and Belgium to 3 
percentage points of efficiency (instead of, respectively, 9.1, 13.0 and 9.6), between 
France and Finland, Germany and Ireland by 6 points (instead of 14.5, 13.8 and 11.5), 
between France and the U.S. by 7 points instead of 20.0 and between France and New 
Zealand by 8 points instead of 20.8.  
These simulations show that EDU explains much of the difference in performance 
between France and comparable countries.  
   32
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Years of EDU 
1995 
GDP per capita 
1997  
Average all countries (N=191)  56.8 442.4 6.0 7385.4
Average EDU non missing (N=111)  57.3 553.6 6.0 8783.6
Average high EDU (N=57)  66.1 945.1 8.3 13898.8
Average low EDU (N=54)  48.1 140.3 3.6 3054.6
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Table 2: coefficients of a stochastic production frontier, composed error model, normal, 
half-normal, using WHR00 data (Gravelle et al, 2002) or a mix of WHR00 and Barro and 
Lee (2000) data (this study) 
Coefficient  Gravelle et al. 2002 (data are 
WHR00, pooled, 141 
countries used in the 
estimate) 
This study (data are mixed 
WHR00 and Barro and Lee) 
Intercept  + 3.233  + 3.125 
Expenditures  + 0.080  + 0.109 
Education  + 0.240  + 0.245 
Education, squared  - 0.012  - 0.036 
R2 0.69  0.68 
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Table 3: values of sum of squares of residuals in two equations of DALE on 
EXPENDITURES and EDU and EDU squared, each subset of countries being determined 
according to a threshold value for EDU 
Threshold value 









Sum of SSRs 
5.0 42  0.871  1.324  2.195 
5.1 43  0.879  1.216  2.095 
5.2 46  1.153  1.020  2.173 
5.3 46  1.153  1.020  2.173 
5.4 47  1.154  1.014  2.168 
5.5 51  1.364  0.735  2.099 
5.6 51  1.364  0.735  2.099 
5.7 52  1.425  0.635  2.060 
5.8 54  1.428  0.604  2.032 
5.9 55  1.701  0.513  2.214 
6.0 57  1.767  0.276  2.043 
6.1 61  1.993  0.056  2.049 
6.2 63  2.143  0.054  2.197 
6.3 63  2.143  0.054  2.197 
6.4 63  2.143  0.054  2.197 
6.5 66  2.250  0.048  2.298 
6.6 66  2.250  0.048  2.298   39
6.7 67  2.255  0.048  2.303 
6.8 68  2.256  0.048  2.304 
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Table 4: values of coefficients estimated on both subsets of countries for the production 
frontiers: 
Coefficient Low  education  countries 
(below 5.8) N=54 
High education countries 
(above 5.8) N=57 
Intercept  + 3.35   + 1.09 
Expenditure  + 0.10   + 0.04 
Education  + 0.29  + 2.78 
Education, squared  - 0.05   - 0.65 
Sigma v (random term)  0.028  0.000 
Sigma u (efficiency term)  0.276  0.138   41 
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18 7  
Cuba  68.4 109 7.54        1.000 2 20 18 




33 0  
Croatia  67.0 410 6.06 7775.68     1.000 4 27 23 




51 0 5  




6 19 13 




7 21 14 




81- 7  
China  62.3 74 6.11  2997.31     0.984 9 28 19 




10 4 -6 




11 6 -5 




12 5 -7 
Sri Lanka  62.8 77 6.45  2948.35     0.969 13 32 19   42 




14 38 24 




15 2 -13 
Paraguay  63.0 206  6.1  4708.81     0.961 16 26 10 




17 36 19 




18 14 -4 




19 13 -6 
Chile  68.6 581 7.25 8502.83       0.953 20 12 -8 




21 29 8 




22 11 -11 
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of  65.0 298 6.69 5973.89     0.945 23 17 -6 
Netherlands  72.0 1911 9.12  23438.9     0.943 24 9 -15 




25 16 -9 
Guyana  60.2 130  6  4040.11     0.941 26 48 22 
Austria  71.6 1960 8.05  24230.1     0.938 27 7 -20 




28 34 6 




29 24 -5 




30 22 -8 
Ecuador  61.0 186 6.14 3250.84     0.931 31 45 14 




32 23 -9 




33 39 6 




34 15 -19 
Ireland  69.6 1200 9.08  21540.8     0.927 35 18 -17   43 
1
Poland  66.2 392 9.64 8345.58     0.923 36 43 7 
Mexico  65.0 421 6.96  7703.2      0.922 37 30 -7 
Uruguay  67.0 849 7.31 8568.14     0.917 38 25 -13 
Bulgaria  64.4 193 9.26 5189.41     0.916 39 44 5 
Malaysia  61.4 202 6.49  8292.8     0.914 40 40 0 




41 31 -10 
Trinidad and Tobago  64.6 325 7.44 7162.67     0.911 42 37 -5 




43 42 -1 
Panama  66.0 449 8.36 5392.46     0.909 44 33 -11 
Thailand  60.2 327 6.08 6397.77     0.905 45 47 2 
Romania  62.3 136 9.42  5743     0.899 46 51 5 




47 50 3 




48 35 -13 
Jordan  60.0 178 6.47 3790.45     0.898 49 46 -3 




50 49 -1 




51 41 -10 
Russian Federation  61.3 251 9.77 6132.26     0.869 52 55 3 
Philippines  58.9 100 7.88 3738.37     0.858 53 54 1 
Peru  59.4 246 7.31 4567.22     0.849 54 52 -2 
Fiji  59.4 214 8.08 4633.64     0.841 55 53 -2 
South Africa  39.8 396 6.03 9063.68     0.596 56 56 0 
Botswana  32.3 219 5.86 6082.18     0.500 57 57 0 
Indonesia  59.7 56 4.55  3148.66 0.984  1      
Nepal  49.5 41 2.01  1189.18 0.982  2      
Jamaica  67.3 212 5.02  3461.2 0.977  3      
Gambia  48.3 52 1.95  1507.8 0.966  4        44 
Algeria  61.6 122 4.83 4846.16 0.963  5      
Pakistan  55.9 71 3.92  1748.68 0.953  6      
Guinea-Bissau  37.2 54 0.78  983.38 0.952  7      
Honduras  61.1 156  4.5  2482.64 0.947  8      
Dominican Republic  62.5 202 4.66  4958.4 0.940  9      
Guatemala  54.3 87 3.25  3620.48 0.939  10      
Myanmar  51.6 78 2.64    0.938  11      
Bangladesh  49.9 70 2.41  1338.14 0.935  12      
Turkey  62.9 231 5.12 5886.62 0.922  13      
Syrian Arab Republic  58.8 109 5.48 3145.27 0.920  14      
Egypt  58.5 118 4.98 3047.14 0.919  15      
Nicaragua  58.1 150 4.09 2953.19 0.918  16      
El Salvador  61.5 228  4.7  4281.34 0.915  17      
Tunisia  61.4 239 4.53 5316.44 0.913  19      
Iraq  55.3 110 3.74    0.913  18      
Iran, Islamic Republic of  60.5 200 4.73 5348.78 0.911  20      
Mali  33.1 34 0.76  701.25 0.896  21      
Costa Rica  66.7 489 5.77 7111.32 0.895  22      
Sudan  43.0 43 1.93  1395.5 0.887  23      
Mauritius  62.7 288 5.79 8179.66 0.886  24      
India  53.2 84 4.52  2055.76 0.876  25      




   
Afghanistan  37.7 28 1.48    0.864  27      




   
Papua New Guinea  47.0 77 2.58  2413.92 0.861  29      
Colombia  62.9 507 4.96  6176.4 0.859  31        45 
Benin  42.2 39 2.14  874.33 0.859  30      
Senegal  44.6 71 2.39  1303.36 0.836  32      
Brazil  59.1 428 4.45 6859.48 0.833  33      
Ghana  45.5 45 3.75  1735.4 0.821  34      
Mozambique  34.4 50 1.03  714.16 0.820  35      
Haiti  43.8 55 2.83  1675 0.815  36      
Bolivia  53.3 153 5.31 2247.52 0.811  37      
Togo  40.7 34 3.15  1687.72 0.778  38      
Niger  29.1 27 0.93  733.43 0.760  39      
Democratic Republic of the Congo  36.3 22 2.89  773.47 0.736  40      
Uganda  32.7 44 3.37  1078.06 0.729  41      
Central African Republic  36.0 34 2.45  1052.18 0.724  42      
Congo  45.1 101 5.12  916.04 0.719  43      
United Republic of Tanzania  36.0 36 2.68  471.23 0.706  44      
Liberia  34.0 33 2.29    0.695  45      
Kenya  39.3 58 4.01  1007.59 0.686  46      
Rwanda  32.8 35 2.36  927.85 0.662  47      
Lesotho  36.9 100 4.06 2084.41 0.610  48      
Cameroon  42.2 86 3.37  1672.22 0.604  49      
Swaziland  38.1 118 5.63 3922.49 0.592  50      
Malawi  29.4 49  2.7  557.75 0.560  51      
Sierra Leone  25.9 31 2.27  492.73 0.534  52      
Zimbabwe  32.9  130  5.19  2725.08 0.513  53      
Zambia  30.3 64 5.42  762.5 0.504  54      
Albania  60.0 63    2654.72          
Andorra  72.3  1216             
Angola  38.0 47    1718.41            46 
Armenia  66.7 152    1839.12          
Azerbaijan  63.7 48    1816.05          
Bahamas  59.1 1230   
14798.6
9         
Belarus  61.7 253    3831.14          
Bhutan  51.8 82              
Bosnia and Herzegovina  64.9 145    4575.09          
Burkina Faso  35.5 37    949.12          
Cambodia  45.7 73    1424.29          
Cape Verde  57.6 60    3875.75          
Chad  39.4 35    848.15          
Comoros  46.8 47    1640.14          
Cook Islands  63.4  345             
Côte d'Ivoire  42.8 57    1557.89          
Democratic People's Republic of Korea  52.3 39              
Djibouti  37.9 48    1934.7          
Equatorial Guinea  44.1 89    3561.94          
Eritrea  37.7 24    850.37          
Ethiopia  33.5 20    628.4          
Gabon  47.8 196    6314.59          
Georgia  66.3 94    1646.17          
Grenada  65.5 298    5650.43          
Guinea  37.8 52    1809.53          
Kazakhstan  56.4 127    3602.34          
Kiribati  55.3 152               
Kyrgyzstan  56.3 66    1351.57          
Lao People's Democratic Republic  46.1 53    1335.24            47 
Latvia  62.2 246    6051.61          
Lebanon  60.6 563    4148.18          
Lithuania  64.1 273    7453.33          
Luxembourg  71.1 1985   
39677.6
5         
Madagascar  36.6 18    760.88          
Maldives  53.9 248               
Malta  70.5 755   
14645.0
5         
Marshall Islands  56.8 238               
Micronesia, Federated States of  59.6 234               
Monaco  72.4  1799             
Mongolia  53.8 69    1470.09          
Morocco  59.1 159    3234.79          
Nauru  52.5  602             
Nigeria  38.3 35    804.34          
Niue  61.6 92              
Oman  63.0 334   
11664.9
7         
Palau  59.0  559             
Qatar  63.5  1105             
Republic of Moldova  61.5 133    1357.33          
Saint Kitts and Nevis  61.6 489   
10626.5
9         
Saint Lucia  65.0 218    5196.71          
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines  66.4 210    4634.35          
Samoa  60.5 108    4421.06          
San Marino  72.3  1301             
Sao Tome and Principe  53.5 45              
Saudi Arabia  64.5  332    11921.9           48 
2
Somalia  36.4 11              
Suriname  62.7 257               
Tajikistan  57.3 94    656.7          
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia  63.7 141    5650.24          
Tonga  62.9 257    5083.93          
Turkmenistan  54.3 90    2265.12          
Tuvalu  57.4 59              
Ukraine  63.0 128    3628.82          
Uzbekistan  60.2 109    1328.46          
Viet Nam  58.2 65    1696.58          
Yugoslavia  66.1 127               
Antigua and Barbuda  65.8 598    9132.62          
Belize  60.9  212    4652.87         
Brunei Darussalam  64.4 857               
Burundi  34.6  26    585.54         
Dominica  69.8  286    4984.48         
Estonia  63.1 346    8373.18          
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  59.3  221             
Mauritania  41.4  73    1601.82         
Namibia  35.6  312    5697.61         
Seychelles  59.3 470               
Solomon Islands  54.9  83    2277.75         




   
Vanuatu  52.8  85    3131.24         
Yemen  49.7  33    739.26         